Lerma v. ERS (Tex.App.- Austin 2008)

Frances E. Lerma v. Employees Retirement System of Texas, No. (Tex.App. - Austin , May 1, 2008)( )(sicko law, disability denial affirmed, workplace safety, injury) (Before Justices Patterson, Pemberton and Waldrop)
Appeal from 345th District Court of Travis County

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Frances E. Lerma, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's order affirming a final order by the Board of Trustees for the Employees Retirement System of Texas denying her application for occupational disability benefits. In four points of error, Lerma contends that (1) the Board applied a different legal standard regarding the cause of Lerma's injury than it applied in two previous cases; (2) the Board's interpretation of the statutory definition of occupational disability is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute; (3) the Board engaged in ad hoc rulemaking; and (4) the Board's order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the district court's order.
Lerma worked as a child support officer for the Office of the Attorney General. Her primary job duty was to enforce the collection of child support payments from non-custodial parents. In April 2002, Lerma was meeting with a non-custodial parent when the parent became extremely angry and, according to Lerma, exhibited threatening conduct. After this incident, Lerma continued to work as a child support officer until July 2002, when she was diagnosed with a personality disorder and dismissed from her employment.
After her dismissal, Lerma applied for occupational disability benefits from the Employees Retirement System, which was created by the legislature for the purpose of providing a retirement system for aged and incapacitated state employees. See Act of May 27, 1947, 50th Leg., R.S., ch. 352, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 697, 697 (statement of purpose). She claimed that the April 4, 2002 incident with the angry non-custodial parent was the primary cause of her diagnosis of personality disorder. On February 20, 2004, ERS sent Lerma a letter denying her claim for benefits on the ground that her disability did not meet the statutory definition of an occupational disability in section 811.001(12) of the government code. (1) In the letter, ERS explained:
The Medical Board has determined that the primary cause of your incapacity is recurrent, severe, major depression and anxiety disorder that began as early as 1988. You attribute your major depression and anxiety to an increased level of stress on the job that you believe began in January 2000. However, the medical evidence indicates that these are chronic conditions that existed prior to your employment as a Child Support Officer III with the Office of the Attorney General, and were not caused by the job duties.
ERS also stated that Lerma failed to seek reasonable accommodation of her condition at work and that the medical evidence indicated that Lerma should be able to perform her job duties or comparable work.
Lerma appealed ERS's denial of her application for benefits and, after an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposal for decision recommending that Lerma's appeal be denied. On April 20, 2005, the ERS Board of Trustees adopted the ALJ's proposal for decision, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law, as its own. Lerma sought judicial review of the Board's decision. On May 5, 2006, the district court held a hearing and issued an order affirming the Board's final order denying Lerma's application for occupational disability benefits.
In her first point of error, Lerma contends that the Board applied a different legal standard regarding the cause of her injury than it applied in two previous cases. Those previous cases concerned two former state employees, Mary L. Dean and Francisca G. Link, who applied for occupational disability benefits with ERS in 1994 and 1998, respectively. (2) ERS denied Dean's and Link's application for benefits, and they both appealed. The Board granted both appeals, finding that both individuals were entitled to occupational disability benefits and that their claims were not barred by preexisting conditions caused solely by natural aging processes.
We review the Board's findings under the substantial evidence rule. Tex. Gov't Code Ann.