In the Matter of R.M, No. (Tex.App.- Austin, May , 2008)
) (Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Waldrop)
(juvenile case) (affirmed)
Appeal from 98th District Court of Travis County

R.M., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for possession of less than one gram of cocaine and, in a separate disposition order, was committed to the Texas Youth Commission for an indeterminate period of time. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.03, .04 (West Supp. 2007). On appeal, R.M. contends that the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to TYC. We affirm the trial court's disposition order.
A trial court may not commit a juvenile to TYC unless it finds that commitment is in the child's best interest, all reasonable efforts were taken to avoid the need to remove the child from his home, and the child could not get the care, support, and supervision he needs to meet probation conditions in his home. Id. § 54.04(i)(1); In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.) (op. on reh'g). A juvenile court has broad discretion in determining the suitable disposition of a juvenile who has engaged in delinquent conduct. In re A.I., 82 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, pet. denied). In reviewing the court's decision on disposition, we ask whether the court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. Id. at 379-80. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if some substantive and probative evidence supports its decision. In re C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). Legal and factual sufficiency may be relevant in assessing the trial court's exercise of its discretion, and we review evidentiary sufficiency under the standards applied in criminal cases. Id. at 702-04; see In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d at 858-59.
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The evidence supports the trial court's observation that R.M. has a pattern of temporarily improving his behavior when faced with serious consequences, only to slip back into trouble. He was extremely disruptive at school, even though he was only on campus for a few hours a day, and in the spring of 2005, he stopped working despite being enrolled in a work-study program. R.M. was taken into custody six times in about five months time, from early March 2005 until the subject offense in early August, he had been recommended for the Job Corps or a GED program because of his poor performance in school, and the department believed his mother was inconsistent and tended to minimize R.M.'s problems. When released on furlough while in custody due to this charge, R.M. was involved in two different altercations. The court believed that R.M. needed more intensive supervision to give him support and to help him learn to control himself and made the findings required by section 54.04(i)(1) of the family code. When viewed in the light most favorable to the court's findings, the evidence is sufficient to show that TYC commitment is in R.M.'s best interest, that the department made all reasonable efforts to avoid removing him from his home, and that he cannot receive in his home the support, care, and supervision he needs. See In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d at 858. The same is true when all the evidence is viewed in a neutral light. See id. at 859. Although R.M. has shown that he is able to control his behavior when faced with serious consequences, he seems to slip back into misbehavior soon after. He and his family made arrangements for a full-day work program that would put him on track for graduation the following spring, but he had been enrolled in a similar program in the spring of 2005 and did not complete those requirements. We cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that R.M. would be best served by being committed to TYC custody. See In re A.I., 82 S.W.3d at 379-80. We affirm the trial court's order of disposition.