DWOJ

William Alexander Roper, Jr. v. Reagan, Burrus, Dierksen, Lamon & Bluntzer PLLC, No. (Tex.App.- Austin , Mar. 18, 2008)( )(Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Pemberton and Waldrop) William Alexander Roper, Jr. v. Reagan, Burrus, Dierksen, Lamon & Bluntzer PLLC--Appeal from County Court at Law # 2 of Comal County

On February 13, 2007, Reagan Burrus filed a motion to compel payment of the attorney's fees that the trial court had previously awarded in its March 1, 2006 order. On May 10, the trial court granted the motion. It is from this order that appellant purports to appeal.
Our appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments and those limited classes of interlocutory orders over which the legislature has given us jurisdiction. Majeski v. Estate of Majeski, 163 S.W.3d 102, 105 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, no pet.) (citing Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998)). As Roper acknowledges in his docketing statement, the May 10, 2007 order compelling payment of attorney's fees is interlocutory. See Wagner v. Warnasch, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1956) ("[A]n order or decree, made for the purpose of carrying a judgment or decree already entered into effect, is not a final judgment or decree, and cannot be appealed from as such."). Statutes authorizing appeals from interlocutory orders are strictly construed. Art Inst. of Chicago v. Integral Hedging, L.P., 129 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.). In probate proceedings, section 51.014(a) authorizes appeals from an interlocutory order that appoints a receiver or trustee or overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or trustee. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1), (2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). Section 51.014(a) does not authorize an appeal from an interlocutory order compelling payment of previously awarded attorney's fees. See Integral Hedging, L.P., 129 S.W.3d at 573.

In summary, Roper did not timely perfect an appeal from the trial court's March 1, 2006 order and we do not have jurisdiction to consider Roper's appeal from the trial court's May 10, 2007 interlocutory order. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).