Buffalo Equities, Ltd. vs. The City of Austin, No. 03-05-00356-CV (Tex.App.- Austin, May 9, 2008) (Opinion by Justice Puryear) (zoning law, regulatory taking, declaratory judgment, ripeness) (Before Justices Patterson, Puryear and Henson)
Buffalo Equities, Ltd. v. The City of Austin
Appeal from 98th District Court of Travis County
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. GN501665, HONORABLE MARGARET A. COOPER, JUDGE PRESIDING
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Buffalo Equities, Ltd. ("BEL") wanted to develop its property for residential and commercial purposes and applied to have its property appropriately re-zoned. Part of the proposed development consisted of improvements to an easement BEL owns that runs across its neighbor's property. The City of Austin agreed to re-zone BEL's property. However, a City employee, Gregory Guernsey, later wrote a letter to BEL informing BEL that its development plans for its easement did not comply with the relevant zoning restrictions on BEL's neighbor's property. Further, Guernsey stated that BEL, as an easement owner, could not file to have its neighbor's property re-zoned.
Rather than appealing Guernsey's determination or seeking approval from the City for its development plans, BEL, in light of Guernsey's letter, filed suit against the City seeking various declarations and arguing that the City's actions constituted an impermissible regulatory taking of BEL's property. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (declaratory judgment act); Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 672-73 (Tex. 2004) (explaining when regulatory taking may occur).
The district court dismissed BEL's regulatory takings claim for lack of jurisdiction and declared that BEL's intended use for the easement did not comply with the zoning restrictions on the property and that an easement owner may not initiate re-zoning procedures. BEL appeals the judgment of the district court. We will dismiss one of BEL's claims for want of subject-matter jurisdiction and affirm the remaining portions of the district court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
BEL owns approximately 119 acres in Travis County. In 1997, it entered into an easement agreement with one of its neighbors, Speedy Stop. (1) Although there are other means of entering and exiting BEL's property, the easement affords BEL access to highway 290--a major highway in Austin--through a driveway (2) over Speedy Stop's property that is part of a signalized intersection with the highway.
BEL wanted to develop a large portion of its property into residential and commercial areas, and in 2000, BEL applied to have its property re-zoned as a "planned unit development" ("PUD"), which is the designation given to "large or complex single or multi-use development that is planned as a single contiguous project and that is under unified control." See Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-144. The City approved the re-zoning request.
Through discussions BEL had with various City employees about developing the first phase of the PUD, BEL was informed that the City would probably not approve BEL's plans for the first phase of its proposed development. In response to these discussions, BEL asked the City's Development Services Manager, Gregory Guernsey, to issue a statement concerning BEL's plans. Shortly thereafter, Guernsey sent BEL a letter in which he stated that BEL's proposed driveway over the easement did not comply with the zoning restrictions on BEL's neighbor's property. In particular, Guernsey stated that Speedy Stop's property was zoned as a "rural residence district," which is the designation used "for a low density residential use on a lot that is a minimum of one acre," (3) see Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-54, but concluded that BEL's proposed development for the easement constituted a "commercial driveway." Further, Guernsey opined that BEL could not apply to have Speedy Stop's property re-zoned for commercial purposes because BEL did not own the property. After receiving the letter, BEL asked the City's Zoning and Platting Commission to issue a request to re-zone Speedy Stop's property for commercial purposes, but the Commission denied that request. See id. § 25-2-242 (providing that, among other groups, re-zoning of property may be initiated by City Council, Land Use Commission, and record owner of property).
In 2004, BEL filed suit against the City. In its petition, BEL sought a declaration that the City's rules and regulations do not prohibit the use of the driveway as part of the PUD development. Alternatively, BEL sought a declaration that the owner of an easement may file an application to re-zone the property upon which its easement is located. Finally, BEL brought a regulatory takings claim against the City, asserting that by prohibiting BEL from building the driveway, the City has "unreasonably interfered with [BEL]'s right to use and enjoy" its property. (4)
In response, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the case because BEL had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit. In particular, the City argued that BEL failed to properly appeal Guernsey's determination that the proposed development on the easement was a commercial driveway and that the driveway did not comply with the relevant zoning restrictions. Both BEL and the City filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
After reviewing the various motions, the district court dismissed BEL's regulatory takings claim on the ground that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim. In addition, the district court ordered that BEL's intended use for the driveway and easement did not comply with the relevant zoning restrictions because the zoning for the property on which the easement rests did not match the PUD's zoning restrictions. In particular, the court declared that BEL's intended use for the easement qualified as an "accessory use" to the PUD and that the zoning for accessory uses must be consistent with the zoning for the "principal use." See Austin, Tex., Code §§ 25-2-891 (providing, in relevant part, that accessory use is use that is incidental to and customarily associated with principal use), 25-2-892 (stating that, in general, regulations applicable to principal use apply to accessory use). Furthermore, the court declared that BEL, as an easement owner, may not initiate re-zoning procedures for the property on which its easement rests because BEL was not the "record owner" of the property. BEL appeals the judgment of the district court.
SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards for obtaining a traditional summary judgment are well established: the movant must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, the court must take evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Sergeant Enters., Inc. v. Strayhorn, 112 S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, no pet.) (citing Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985)); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). If the movant establishes a right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, who must present summary-judgment evidence to the trial court raising a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. Cannon v. Texas Indep. Bank, 1 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, pet. denied). If the evidence raises no more than a surmise or suspicion of a fact in issue, no genuine issue of fact exists to defeat summary judgment. Selz v. Friendly Chevrolet, Ltd., 152 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Wiggins v. Overstreet, 962 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, writ denied)). We review the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Sergeant Enters., Inc., 112 S.W.3d at 245 (citing Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994)).
When the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment and when the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the non-prevailing party may appeal the denial of its motion as well as the decision to grant the prevailing party's motion. Id. In this situation, an appellate court should review the summary judgment evidence from both sides and determine all the questions presented. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000). After reviewing the evidence, the appellate court "should render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered." Id.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, BEL raises three issues. In particular, BEL argues that the district court erred in issuing its first declaration in favor of the City, in declaring that an easement owner may not seek to re-zone the property upon which its easement rests, and in dismissing BEL's regulatory takings claim. In response, the City argues (1) that this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over BEL's first claim because BEL failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit, (2) that the district court's second declaration was correct, and (3) that the district court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over BEL's regulatory takings claim. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over BEL's first claim but conclude that the district court's second declaration was proper. We also conclude that the district court's determination that it did not have jurisdiction over BEL's third claim was proper. For ease of reading, we will first address the jurisdictional arguments as they relate to the first and third claim. Finally, we will address the merits of BEL's second claim.
First Declaration
Although it did not file a notice of appeal, the City asserts on appeal that the district court did not have jurisdiction over BEL's first declaration and should have granted its plea to the jurisdiction on that issue. See University of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised for first time on appeal by parties or court and that courts have obligation to ascertain whether jurisdiction exists regardless of whether parties question its existence). A determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over a claim presents a question of law. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
A plea to the jurisdiction "is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Sykes, 136 S.W.3d at 638. A plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate that a court has jurisdiction over the claims. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. To prevail, a defendant must establish that there is an "incurable jurisdictional defect on the face of the pleadings." City of Austin v. Rangel, 184 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, no pet.). We construe pleadings in favor of the pleader, but "[i]f the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend." Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
The City contends that Guernsey's letter constituted a "use classification" determination that BEL should have appealed if it was unhappy with the determination. The City's code authorizes the director of the Neighborhood Planning and Zoning Department to make use-classification determinations "for an existing or proposed use or activity." See Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-2. According to the City, the director has delegated this authority to Guernsey. (5) In response to a request by BEL, Guernsey informed BEL that its proposed use of the easement constituted a commercial driveway that did not comply with the zoning restrictions on Speedy Stop's property. The Austin code provides that a party dissatisfied with an "appropriate use classification" determination may appeal the determination to the Board of Adjustment. Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-2; see also id. § 25-1-182 (specifying 20-day deadline for appealing). Similarly, the local government code provides that the Board of Adjustment may "hear and decide an appeal that alleges error in a[] . . . determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of" a local zoning ordinance. Tex. Local Gov't Code Ann. § 211.009(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added); see id. § 211.010 (detailing who may file appeal with Board of Adjustment concerning decision made by "administrative official"). Further, the local government code also specifies that after obtaining review by the Board of Adjustment, an aggrieved party may seek judicial review of the Board's determination. Id. § 211.011.
Courts have routinely held that the administrative remedies available under the portions of the local government relevant to this appeal must be exhausted before a party may seek judicial review of a determination made by an administrative official. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2006, pet. denied); Winn v. City of Irving, 770 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ); see also Grimes v. Stringer, 957 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1997, pet. denied) (construing phrase "may appeal" in statute to mean that aggrieved party has discretion to appeal determination, but if party elects to, it must be appealed to administrative body specified in statute rather than to court). The requirement of administrative exhaustion compels a party to "pursue all available remedies within the administrative process before seeking judicial relief." Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 52 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tex. App.--Austin 2001, pet. denied). The failure to comply with this requirement before seeking judicial review deprives a court of jurisdiction to decide the case. Id.
BEL did not appeal Guernsey's determination to the Board of Adjustment. Consequently, the City's position has not officially been determined through the administrative process, and there is no justiciable controversy present. Winn, 770 S.W.2d at 11-12; see El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d at 250.
BEL claims that it was unnecessary for it to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit because the relief it sought fell within several exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. On appeal, BEL has characterized the declaration it originally sought as a declaration that "the City has no discretion to refuse to accept, process and approve BEL's application based on its new and invalid condition it has imposed on development of the BEL tract and the City has exceeded its authority in so doing." In other words, BEL claims that it is seeking a declaration stating that as a result of the City approving its PUD designation, the City is effectively precluded from improperly imposing a condition on the proposed development of BEL's property at a later stage in the development approval process, e.g., site- or building-permit approval. BEL asserts that resolution of this issue involves, among other things, determinations of pure questions of law and a determination of whether a city employee has exceeded its authority: determinations that BEL claims do not require administrative exhaustion. See Henry v. Kaufman County Dev. Dist. No. 1, 150 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. granted and case remanded by agr.).
In particular, BEL contends that the resolution of its first issue will involve consideration of whether the City may condition the approval of a site-plan application filed by BEL on "fulfillment of a condition that is not required under either the PUD Ordinance or the Code." Furthermore, BEL alleges that resolution of the issue will involve a determination of whether the City's employees may create new use classifications without approval by the City Council and whether the creation of a new classification is "beyond the scope of" the employee's authority. Specifically, BEL argues that the City's code does not list a "commercial driveway" as a type of "use classification," see Austin, Tex., Code §§ 25-2-1 (describing "major use categories" as "residential, commercial, industrial, civic, and agricultural"), 25-2-4 (listing 69 specific commercial use classifications), and that the creation of this new type of classification was beyond Guernsey's or the director of the Neighborhood Planning and Zoning Department's authority. (6)
As a preliminary matter, we note that BEL's characterization of this issue on appeal differs from what was stated in BEL's original petition, which sought a declaration "that the City of Austin rules and regulations (including the Land Development Code) do not prohibit use of the driveway area identified in the 1997 Driveway Easement Agreement across [rural residentially] zoned property to access the . . . [PUD], regardless of the use in the . . . PUD." This declaration, by its terms, is factually dependent and does not present pure questions of law.
Moreover, the fact that a party suggests that the resolution of the issue as framed on appeal might involve some determinations of law cannot be the end of our jurisdictional inquiry; rather, we must also ascertain whether the determination of the "pure questions of law" specified are in fact questions of law and, if so, whether addressing those questions, on their own, will resolve the actual controversy at issue. A declaration that the City may not impose a condition for approval that is contrary to the City's code will not resolve the controversy over whether Guernsey's determination and a potential decision by the City to forestall development are improper and contrary to the City's code. Similarly, a declaration that the City's employees may not create new use classifications without approval by the City Council will not, on its own, resolve the conflict of whether BEL's proposed improvements to the easement will violate relevant zoning restrictions or whether Guernsey's determination that BEL's intended use for the easement was commercial in nature was inaccurate or improper.
The first issue on appeal will not be resolved by consideration of pure questions of law and will involve consideration of significant factual matters, rendering it an issue primed for administrative exhaustion. Moreover, because BEL has bypassed the administrative process, we have no way of knowing what the City's ultimate response to BEL's arguments would have been. Although in part of its argument BEL concedes that Guernsey's letter constituted a use determination, albeit an improper one, BEL also argues that the letter could not constitute a use-classification determination. As described previously, the City's code does not specifically list "commercial driveway" as a type of use classification, see Austin, Tex., Code §§ 25-2-1, 25-2-4, and for this reason, BEL contends that the letter did not qualify as a use determination.
Even assuming that the letter was not a use determination and that the letter was in fact just an opinion by one of the City's employees, we would still conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over the case because no justiciable controversy is present. Prior to filing suit, BEL did not file an actual site-plan application, and the City has, therefore, taken no position on whether it would approve an application. See Austin, Tex., Code §§ 25-5-1 (providing, with certain exceptions, that "a site plan must be approved and released under this chapter before: (1) a person may change the use of property; (2) a person may develop property; or (3) the building official may issue a building permit)," 25-5-149 (stating that site-plan applicant may appeal denial of its application to City Council). Consequently, if Guernsey's letter was not a use determination, BEL has asked the district court and this Court to issue an advisory opinion regarding its future rights if the City decides to deny BEL's application, and there is, therefore, no actual controversy to resolve. See Thomas v. City of San Marcos, 477 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1972, no writ) (concluding that when City official sent property owner letter requesting owner cease development of his property, court did not have jurisdiction over claim because owner did not file for permits to build on property and, therefore, had not exhausted administrative remedies).
Accordingly, whether the letter is viewed as a use determination or not, this Court does not have jurisdiction over BEL's first issue. Consequently, we conclude that the district court should have granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction with respect to this issue. Moreover, because BEL admits that it did not appeal Guernsey's determination or file a site-plan application, we conclude that the record affirmatively negates the existence of jurisdiction and that dismissal is appropriate. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2 (explaining that one of permissible types of appellate judgments is to dismiss); South Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. 2007) (dismissing case after determining court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over case).
Regulatory Takings Claim
In addition to the declarations sought against the City, BEL also contends that the City's actions constituted a regulatory taking of BEL's property because by "denying [BEL] the ability to build the driveway, [the] City . . . has denied [BEL] all economically viable use of their property and [the] City . . . has unreasonably interfered with [BEL's] right to use and enjoy same." See Rowlett/2000 v. City of Rowlett, 231 S.W.3d 587, 590-91 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2007, no pet.) (explaining that city's passage of ordinance may injure property's value or usefulness, which, in some circumstances, might constitute taking).
To bring a regulatory takings claim, the claim must be ripe for resolution. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1998); see also Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that ripeness is necessary component of subject-matter jurisdiction and concerns when a claim may be made). For a regulatory takings claim to be ripe, "there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 929. A final decision usually occurs after a development plan has been formally rejected by a city and after the city has rejected the property owner's request for a variance. Id. at 929-30. In this context, the term "variance" is applied flexibly and encompasses permits and other applications that provide relief that is similar to a variance. City of Houston v. Kolb, 982 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). The purpose behind requiring the denial of a variance or similar requested relief is to give the city an opportunity to grant some form of relief or make a policy decision that will abrogate the alleged taking. Id. The requirement of a final decision stems, in part, from the need to have sufficient evidence to be able to compare uses prohibited by the regulation with permissible uses that may be made of the affected property in order to properly ascertain whether a taking has in fact occurred. See Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 929.
Although BEL received a letter from a City employee stating that BEL's intended use for the easement did not comply with the relevant zoning restrictions, BEL has not referred us to any regulation or case that equates this type of letter with a rejection of a development plan, that establishes that the receipt of this type of letter forecloses continued development approval through site-plan applications and building-permit applications, or that characterizes this type of letter as a final decision on the matter. (7) On the contrary, the various reports and the ordinance granting the PUD designation all demonstrate that the City has not foreclosed the possibility that BEL will be able to develop the easement in question: quite the contrary, they all contemplate development of the easement. Moreover, even assuming that the letter is a rejection of BEL's development plan, nothing in the record demonstrates that BEL sought a variance or similar relief from Guernsey's determination, and consequently, the City has not issued a denial of the relief requested.
BEL insists that, in this case, it was unnecessary for BEL to file for a variance in order for this Court to have jurisdiction over the claim. Specifically, BEL contends that it is unnecessary for a party to file what amounts to "futile variance requests or re-applications" before filing a takings claim. See id. at 929-30. However, nothing in the letter or the remainder of the record indicates that BEL had been informed that it would have been futile to petition for some type of relief from Guernsey's determination or that Guernsey and other officials would have been unreceptive to BEL's arguments. Furthermore, BEL presented no evidence or testimony from City officials that the City would not have considered allowing for a variance or some other form of relief. See Kolb, 982 S.W.2d at 953-54 (detailing testimony of various officials that it would have been futile for property owner to file for variance because city would not have approved it under any circumstances).
Moreover, the case BEL relies on as demonstrating that it would be futile for BEL to file applications is distinguishable from this case. In Mayhew, the Mayhews requested approval to build between 3,650 and 5,025 properties, but the Mayhews modified their application by asking to develop fewer properties after receiving negative feedback from the town's zoning committee. 964 S.W.2d at 931. Even after the Mayhews made the modification, the town of Sunnyvale denied a planned development application, but the Mayhews did not file for a variance. 964 S.W.2d at 931. In determining that the claim was ripe, the court noted that the Mayhews' proposed modification to their application might have, on its own, satisfied the variance requirement. But even if the modification was not a variance, the court concluded that it still had jurisdiction because the Mayhews alleged that they could not make an additional compromise to the number of properties that were to be developed because any further reduction would render the project economically unviable. Id. at 931-32. In essence, the court concluded that after receiving a rejection by a city, property owners should not be required to submit additional permits for development that would render the development unprofitable before being able to seek judicial relief. Id. at 932. Further, the court indicated that if the Mayhews had not made the economic allegation, the claim might otherwise not be ripe. Id.
Neither of those circumstances is present here. BEL proposed no modification after receiving the letter from Guernsey, and BEL has not demonstrated that any modification to its proposed development would render the development economically undesirable.
For all the reasons previously given, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over BEL's regulatory takings claim, affirm that portion of the district court's judgment, and overrule BEL's third issue on appeal.
Second Declaration
In addition to the first declaration previously discussed, (8) BEL also sought a declaration that "an owner of an easement has the right to file an application to re-zone, if necessary, the area subject to such easement." The Austin code lists the individuals and governmental bodies that may file to re-zone property and provides, in relevant part, that zoning or re-zoning may be initiated by "(1) [the City] Council; (2) [the] Land Use Commission; (3) [the] record owner; (4) [the] Historic Landmark Commission, . . . ; or (5) for a proposed historic area (HD) combining district, petition of the owners of at least 60 percent of the land in the proposed district." Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-242. After construing this portion of the code, the district court issued a declaration stating that because BEL "is not a 'record owner'" of the property on which its easement sits, it "may not . . . initiate zoning or rezoning of [the] property subject to the easement."
On appeal, BEL argues that the district court erred in issuing the declaration and in refusing to make the declaration that BEL originally requested. In making this assertion, BEL contends that as a result of entering into an easement agreement with Speedy Stop, it is a "record owner" of a property interest in Speedy Stop's property. BEL further notes that because it is an easement holder, it has a right to use the easement that is superior to Speedy Stop's, see McDaniel v. Calvert, 875 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1994, no writ), and that it has whatever implied rights to the property are necessary "to fairly enjoy the rights expressly granted," see Marcus Cable Assocs. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. 2002).
In light of the preceding, BEL insists that the district court's declaration that BEL may not seek to re-zone the property is erroneous and is an inaccurate construction of the City's code that leads to the absurd result that an owner of a tract that has had its property zoned as a PUD will be prohibited from developing its property if the easement that will serve as an entrance to the development is not appropriately zoned but will also be prohibited from filing to have the property re-zoned. Moreover, BEL argues that the City's refusal to accept its zoning modification request is arbitrary, unreasonable, and in excess of its authority.
Resolution of this issue involves construing various City ordinances, which is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. 2002); USA Waste Servs. of Houston, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 150 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. denied); see also Coppell v. General Homes Corp., 763 S.W.2d 448, 453 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1988, writ denied) (explaining that courts construe city ordinances in same manner that they construe statutes). When construing ordinances, we must ascertain the intent of the governing body enacting the regulations at issue. Coppell, 763 S.W.2d at 453; see Fleming Foods of Tex. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999). In determining intent, courts should look to the plain meaning of the words used in the ordinances. Coppell, 763 S.W.2d at 43; see Fireman's Fund County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hidi, 13 S.W.3d 767, 768-69 (Tex. 2000). We presume that every word was deliberately chosen and that excluded words were left out purposely. USA Waste Servs., 150 S.W.3d at 494. When determining intent, the entire regulation, not isolated portions, must be considered. Coppell, 763 S.W.2d at 453; Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998). In determining intent, courts also give serious consideration to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing provided that the interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the relevant governing regulations. Continental Cas. Co. v. Downs, 81 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Tex. 2002); see City of Austin v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 92 S.W.3d 434, 441-42 (Tex. 2002).
For the reasons that follow, we disagree with BEL. First, the district court's declaration is consistent with the relevant governing regulations. The City's code specifies that a "record owner" may initiate re-zoning procedures. Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-242. The code defines a record owner as "the owner of real property as shown by the deed records of the county in which the property is located." Id. § 25-1-21(86); see also id. § 25-1-134(B) (explaining that when notice needs to be given to "record owner" of real property, notice may be made "by mailing notice to the owner at the street address of the property or, if the property does not have a street address, to the return address shown on the deed").
Second, the declaration is also consistent with common law principles associated with easements. "[A]n easement is a nonpossessory interest that authorizes its holder to use property for only particular purposes" and constitutes a limited relinquishment of the right of a property owner to exclude others from his property. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d at 700; see Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 1.2 cmt. d (distinguishing between easements, which allow owner to only use land for specific purposes, and possessory land interest, which permits owner to use property for any purpose). In other words, an easement is a privilege to use land that is completely distinct from ownership of the land, Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2005, no pet.), and an easement does not convey title to property, Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007); Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.--Austin 1988, writ denied).
Third, the declaration is also consistent with the construction of the regulations made by the agency responsible for administering the City's zoning regulations. According to Guernsey's affidavit, the Neighborhood Planning and Zoning Department, which is responsible for administering the City's zoning regulations, equates the phrase "record owner" with "land owner" or "fee owner." Although BEL may own an easement right, it is not the owner of the property on which its easement rests.
Finally, the declaration is consistent with the terms of the easement in question. An easement is an agreement between a property owner and another party, and for this reason, courts apply basic contract principles of construction when determining the terms of the agreement. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d at 700. The parties' express intentions determine the scope of the easement. Id. The easement agreement at issue here specifies that it "contains the entire agreement between the parties relating to the easements, rights and privileges herein granted and undertaken." The agreement does not mention zoning in any manner and does not bequeath the right to re-zone the property to BEL. (9) Cf. Cross v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist. No. 1, 773 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ) (detailing easement requirements, which included requirement that easement owner support all zoning requests and building-permit requests made by property owner).
For these reasons, we are persuaded that the district court properly declared that BEL, as an easement owner, may not seek to re-zone the property on which its easement rests. Accordingly, we overrule BEL's second issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the preceding, we dismiss BEL's first issue on appeal and affirm the remainder of the district court's judgment.
David Puryear, Justice
Before Justices Patterson, Puryear and Henson
Affirmed in part; Dismissed in part
Filed: May 9, 2008
1. At the time the agreement was entered, Speedy Stop was not the owner of the property in question. However, by the time this lawsuit was filed, Speedy Stop had purchased the property. For ease of reading, we will refer to the owner of the property as Speedy Stop.
2. Although BEL originally characterized the paved portion of the easement as a driveway, it contends on appeal that the strip is actually an "access street." See Austin, Tex., Code § 25-4-157(A)(1) (defining "access street" as "street that provides access to a sub-division by connecting to an external street"). However, because the distinction is not relevant to our ultimate conclusion, we will refer to the strip as a driveway.
3. Although not relevant to the ultimate outcome of this case, we do note that Speedy Stop has engaged in commercial activities on its property for years. See Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-222 (providing that, in general, property annexed by City will initially be designated as rural residence district regardless of property's actual use).
4. In its petition, BEL also made several claims against Speedy Stop. However, the claims against Speedy Stop were subsequently severed from the claims against the City. This appeal only concerns the claims against the City.
5. BEL does not dispute that the director delegated this authority to Guernsey or argue that this type of delegation is improper.
6. Although we need not reach the merits of whether Guernsey's characterization of the intended use for the easement as a commercial driveway was an improper use classification, we do note that although the code does not specifically include "commercial driveways" in its list of "use classifications," nothing in the code indicates that the list is exhaustive. In fact, section 25-2-2 seems to acknowledge that a proposed use might not fit within one of the enumerated categories. In particular, the section instructs the reviewer to "consider the characteristics of the proposed use and the similarities, if any, of the use to other classified uses." Austin, Tex., Code § 25-2-2(B) (emphasis added). Moreover, the code does include driveways within the description of a specific commercial use classification, which is some indication that the City intended for reviewers to consider driveways as part of a "use classification" determination. See id.
7. It is worth noting again that BEL has not actually filed a site-plan application to develop its property and that, consequently, the City has not formally refused to accept an application.
8. The City limited its jurisdictional arguments to BEL's first and third issues and does not contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over BEL's second issue on appeal. However, we note that unlike the first issue, the second issue concerns a pure question of law, rendering the determination appropriate for decision despite the fact that BEL had not exhausted all of its administrative remedies. See Henry v. Kaufman County Dev. Dist. No. 1, 150 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. granted and case remanded by agr.). Furthermore, prior to filing suit, BEL was informed by a City employee that it would be unable to apply to re-zone Speedy Stop's property, and BEL's petition to the City's Zoning and Platting Commission to issue a request to re-zone Speedy Stop's property was denied. Consequently, there is a "justiciable controversy as to the rights and status of" the parties, and the requested declaration will "actually resolve the controversy." Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163-64 (Tex. 2004); see Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Moore, 985 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.) (explaining that justiciable controversy "is one in which a real and substantial controversy exists involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not merely a theoretical dispute").
9. In this opinion, we make no comment on whether BEL may sue Speedy Stop to compel Speedy Stop to initiate a zoning request. We only note that the easement did not expressly give BEL the ability to initiate a zoning change.
Showing posts with label zoning. Show all posts
Showing posts with label zoning. Show all posts
Monday, May 12, 2008
Saturday, January 26, 2008
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies nets dismissal on Defendant City's plea to the jurisdiction
Sarah Horton v. City of Smithville, Texas, No. 03-07-00174-CV (Tex.App.- Austin, Jan. 25, 2008)(Opinion by Justice Henson)(local government law, administrative remedies) (Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Waldrop and Henson)Sarah Horton v. City of Smithville, Texas
Appeal from 21st District Court of Bastrop County
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY, 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 24,734, HONORABLE TERRY L. FLENNIKEN, JUDGE PRESIDING
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Sarah Horton appeals from the trial court's order granting the City of Smithville's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. Horton brought suit against the City of Smithville ("the City") in connection with a private party's use of real property adjacent to her residence as a live-music venue, bringing claims of nuisance, civil conspiracy, unconstitutional taking, and violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act. Horton also brought claims against Todd and Elise Helmcamp, the operators of the live-music venue.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction regarding the nuisance, civil conspiracy, and unconstitutional taking claims, and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, which also addressed the claim of Texas Open Meetings Act violations. The trial court, after granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, severed the claims against the City from the claims pending against the Helmcamps, and Horton appealed. Because Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction. We do not address the motion for summary judgment because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of all claims raised on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Horton owns real property in Smithville, Texas, which is adjacent to property owned by the Helmcamps. According to the City's zoning ordinance, the Horton property and the Helmcamp property are located in an area zoned as a C-2 district, or a "General Commercial District." Property in a C-2 district may be used for general and limited retail, office, warehouse and distribution, research and development, and other establishments that involve similar amounts of noise, odor, dust, vibration, blast, and traffic. A non-exhaustive list of businesses expressly allowed in C-2 districts includes restaurants, department stores, supermarkets, hotels, dance and music studios, convenience stores, and gas stations.
The City's zoning ordinance also create various set-back, parking, and noise barrier requirements for property located in C-2 districts. The ordinance includes a grandfather clause, which states that non-conforming structures existing at the time the structural requirements were created need not comply, unless the structure is enlarged, moved, or substantially destroyed. The City's zoning ordinance was initially enacted in 1979 and amended in 1998. Both the Horton home and the structure on the Helmcamp property were in existence at the time of the initial enactment in 1979.
In the fall of 2002, the Helmcamps began using their property as the "Waystation Opry," a live-music venue. Before launching the Waystation Opry, the Helmcamps sought the advice of Jack Page, the City's Public Works Director, regarding whether the property was zoned for use as a live-music venue. Page indicated that he believed that the property was zoned for such use. In response to Horton's complaints regarding the Waystation Opry, Page conferred with Tex Middlebrook, Smithville City Manager. After reviewing the zoning ordinance, both Middlebrook and Page came to the conclusion that the property's use as a live-music venue did not violate the ordinance. Page then informed Horton that her only recourse against the Waystation Opry would be to inform the police if the music became loud enough to violate the City's noise ordinance.
The parties do not dispute that the Waystation Opry fails to comport with the set-back, parking, and noise barrier requirements of the City's zoning ordinance. Page and Middlebrook, after reviewing the ordinance, took the position that the Helmcamps' property is exempt from these requirements because it is subject to the grandfather clause for nonconforming structures.
On October 15, 2002, Horton brought suit in federal court against the City and the Helmcamps, alleging violations of her equal protection and due process rights, as well as conspiracy, fraud, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The federal district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment as to all federal claims and dismissed without prejudice all state-law claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
In response to Horton's litigation and the accompanying legal fees, the Helmcamps voluntarily discontinued the Waystation Opry. Since that time, the Waystation Opry has not operated on the Helmcamps' property. (1) During the time of its operation, the Waystation Opry hosted a total of six live-music events, which were held on one Saturday per month from the hours of 6:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
While Horton's suit was pending in federal court, she filed suit against the City and the Helmcamps in state court, pleading causes of action for nuisance, civil conspiracy, unconstitutional taking, and violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity and that Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Alternatively, the City moved for both traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The trial court issued an order granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. (2) The claims against the City were subsequently severed, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Horton contends that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims because she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies and because the Texas Tort Claims Act provides a statutory waiver of the City's governmental immunity. She further contends that summary judgment was improper because she presented a fact issue regarding her claims of nuisance and unconstitutional taking. Horton does not appeal the trial court's judgment regarding her causes of action for civil conspiracy or violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether this burden has been met and whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts establishes or negates a trial court's jurisdiction are questions of law reviewed de novo. Id. In performing this review, an appellate court does not look to the merits of the case but considers only the pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id.
ANALYSIS
Objections to Appellant's Brief
The City argues that because Horton's brief does not include citations to the appellate record and her appendix contains items that are not part of the appellate record, she has failed to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and therefore has waived all points of error on appeal.
It is a basic and well-established rule of appellate procedure that statements of fact in a party's brief must be supported by record references. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). An appellant is required to refer the appellate court to those portions of the record that support her argument, as the appellate court "is under no duty to make an independent search of the record for evidence supporting an appellant's position." Brandon v. American Sterilizer Co., 880 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ). Horton's statement of facts makes no reference to the appellate record.
However, the rules of appellate procedure also require that briefing rules be liberally construed. Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; see Moore County v. Bergner, 526 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1975, no writ) ("If we can determine from the points of error, the statements, and the arguments the complaints presented by appellant's brief, then we will liberally construe the briefing rules to pass on the merits of the case."); Brown v. Malinowski, 347 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1961, no writ) (noting that, where no record references were made in a statement of facts, "[w]e have applied extremely liberal construction to the briefing rules so as to consider the brief"). Because we are able to determine the complaints presented by Horton's brief, we will apply a liberal construction of the briefing rules so that we may address the merits of her case.
However, we cannot consider those portions of Horton's appendix that are not included in the appellate record. See Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979) (appellate courts may not consider matters outside the appellate record). Tab F of Horton's appendix includes a DVD containing video footage that was referenced by counsel during the trial court's hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction. On October 19, 2007, this Court issued an order denying Horton's motion to include this video in the appellate record because there was no indication that it had been properly admitted into evidence in the trial court. (3) Tab G of Horton's appendix includes an unsigned affidavit by Horton which describes the video found at Tab F. This affidavit does not appear in the appellate record. Tab I of the appendix includes pages of Middlebrook's deposition transcript that were not included in the record, specifically transcript pages 87, 88, 191, and 194. Materials outside the record that are improperly attached to a party's brief may be stricken and may not be considered on appeal. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, writ denied). As a result, we will strike Tabs F and G from Horton's appendix, as well as the portion of Tab I that includes transcript pages 87, 88, 191, and 194.
Administrative Remedies
Section 211.009 of the Texas Local Government Code provides that a local "board of adjustment" may hear and decide an appeal that alleges error in an order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of a local zoning ordinance. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.009(a)(1) (West 1999). Furthermore, an appeal of a local administrative official's zoning decision may be brought by any "person aggrieved by the decision." Id. § 211.010(a). In the City of Smithville, a Type A general-law municipality, the city council acts as the board of adjustment. See id. § 211.008(g) ("The governing body of a Type A general-law municipality by ordinance may grant the members of the governing body the authority to act as a board of adjustment under this chapter.").
Horton, by virtue of bringing this suit, clearly considers herself to be a person aggrieved by the presence of the Waystation Opry on the Helmcamps' property. While the city council did not issue any type of official order declaring that the Waystation Opry complied with the zoning ordinance, the record reflects that the Waystation Opry was allowed to operate in a C-2 district based on Page's determination as Public Works Director and Middlebrook's determination as City Manager that the Waystation Opry did not violate the zoning ordinance. Horton concedes that she did not appeal the decision of either Page or Middlebrook to the city council as described in sections 211.009 and 211.010 of the Texas Local Government Code, nor did she attempt to get either decision in writing.
The exhaustion rule requires that plaintiffs pursue all available remedies within the administrative process before seeking judicial relief, and the failure to do so deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 52 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tex. App.--Austin 2001, pet. denied). Texas Local Government Code sections 211.009 and 211.010 provide administrative remedies regarding local zoning decisions that must be exhausted before such matters may be brought to the courts for determination. See City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2006, pet. denied); Wynn v. City of Irving, 770 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ) ("It is settled that the administrative remedies provided by Local Government Code section 211.009-.010 . . . must be exhausted before matters regarding nonconforming uses may be brought before the courts.); Thomas v. City of San Marcos, 477 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. App.--Austin 1972, no writ). Section 211.010(a) provides that an aggrieved party "may appeal to the board of adjustment a decision made by an administrative official." Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.010(a) (emphasis added). When a statute provides that a party "may" appeal, such language has been interpreted to mean that an aggrieved party may appeal, but if an appeal is taken, it must be taken to the administrative entity. See Grimes v. Stringer, 957 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1997, pet. denied). It is undisputed that Horton failed to appeal Page and Middlebrook's determinations to the city council.
Horton asserts in her reply brief that any pursuit of administrative remedies "would have been futile and therefore not required." Horton's contention that she is relieved of the exhaustion requirement because she does not expect the city council to grant her a favorable result is unsupported by Texas law. There is an exception to the exhaustion requirement if the available administrative remedies are inadequate or the exhaustion of such remedies would cause irreparable injury. MAG-T, L.P. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 161 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, pet. denied). However, Horton has not made a showing that the exhaustion of administrative remedies would cause irreparable injury, and in light of the fact that the Waystation Opry has ceased operation, it is unlikely that such a showing could be made. Horton has also failed to establish that the city council lacks the authority to grant the particular relief she seeks. See id. ("[P]arties should not be required to pursue the administrative process if the parties would suffer irreparable harm and if the agency is unable to provide relief.").
Horton further argues that because the City "refuses" to enforce its zoning ordinance, there has been no official action by the City and therefore no administrative remedy is available to her. However, the conduct that Horton mischaracterizes as a refusal to enforce a zoning ordinance can be more accurately described as the City's interpretation of its zoning ordinance in a manner adverse to Horton's interests. Furthermore, Horton's argument fails because the statute provides that an aggrieved person may appeal "an order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement" of a zoning ordinance. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.009(a)(1) (West 1999). This language does not require an official order by the city, but merely a determination by an administrative official--a city manager or public works director such as Middlebrook or Page, for example--regarding the enforcement of a zoning ordinance. A determination by two of the City's administrative officials regarding the enforcement of a zoning ordinance is precisely the action that Horton complains of here. Horton, however, failed to appeal the determination of either Middlebrook or Page to the city council and instead filed suit directly in the trial court. Until the City's official position has been determined through the administrative process created by the Texas Local Government Code, there is no justiciable controversy before the trial court. See Winn v. City of Irving, 770 S.W.2d 10, 11-12 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ).
On appeal, Horton requests a declaration from this Court that the City must enforce its zoning ordinance. Such a statement would be advisory, and in any case, wholly unnecessary, because the City has stated, both in its brief and at oral argument, that it is in fact enforcing its zoning ordinance in relation to the Helmcamps' property. Therefore, a declaration such as the one Horton requests, assuming it would be legally accurate, would have no practical effect. In support of her request, Horton asserted at oral argument that such a declaration would give the City an incentive to settle this dispute. This Court declines to issue an impermissible advisory opinion stating that the City must enforce its zoning laws simply because Horton believes that such an opinion might intimidate the City into conceding to her in a zoning dispute that has not yet been addressed at an administrative level. See University of Texas v. Morris, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1961) ("[J]udicial processes cannot be used for purposes of mere harassment in an effort to effect settlements.").
Because Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the trial court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction, and we need not address whether the trial court also lacked jurisdiction on the basis of the City's governmental immunity. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring opinions to be as brief as practicable in addressing issues necessary to final disposition of appeal). Similarly, we need not decide the issues related to the City's motion for summary judgment because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of all claims raised on appeal. The only cause of action falling outside the reach of the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement is the claim of violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act and because that issue was not raised on appeal, it has been waived. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993).
CONCLUSION
Because Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under Texas Local Government Code sections 211.009 and 211.010, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court's order is affirmed.
__________________________________________
Diane Henson, Justice
Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Waldrop and Henson
Affirmed
Filed: January 25, 2008
1. While the Waystation Opry is no longer in operation, a live controversy remains because Horton sought monetary damages in relation to her unconstitutional takings claim. See Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 104 S.W.3d 544, 545 (Tex. 2003) (holding that when monetary damages are at issue, live issue remains in controversy).
2. Because the plea to the jurisdiction did not address the claims made under the Texas Open Meetings Act, the trial court's grant of the plea to the jurisdiction did not dispose of all claims, requiring the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment as well.
3. While Horton's motion to include video footage of the Waystation Opry in the appellate record was denied, the Court notes that there was sufficient testimony in the record, particularly Horton's deposition and the affidavit signed by Paul Horton, to ascertain the general nature and decibel level of the Waystation Opry's live-music events.
Appeal from 21st District Court of Bastrop County
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY, 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 24,734, HONORABLE TERRY L. FLENNIKEN, JUDGE PRESIDING
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Sarah Horton appeals from the trial court's order granting the City of Smithville's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. Horton brought suit against the City of Smithville ("the City") in connection with a private party's use of real property adjacent to her residence as a live-music venue, bringing claims of nuisance, civil conspiracy, unconstitutional taking, and violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act. Horton also brought claims against Todd and Elise Helmcamp, the operators of the live-music venue.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction regarding the nuisance, civil conspiracy, and unconstitutional taking claims, and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, which also addressed the claim of Texas Open Meetings Act violations. The trial court, after granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, severed the claims against the City from the claims pending against the Helmcamps, and Horton appealed. Because Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction. We do not address the motion for summary judgment because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of all claims raised on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Horton owns real property in Smithville, Texas, which is adjacent to property owned by the Helmcamps. According to the City's zoning ordinance, the Horton property and the Helmcamp property are located in an area zoned as a C-2 district, or a "General Commercial District." Property in a C-2 district may be used for general and limited retail, office, warehouse and distribution, research and development, and other establishments that involve similar amounts of noise, odor, dust, vibration, blast, and traffic. A non-exhaustive list of businesses expressly allowed in C-2 districts includes restaurants, department stores, supermarkets, hotels, dance and music studios, convenience stores, and gas stations.
The City's zoning ordinance also create various set-back, parking, and noise barrier requirements for property located in C-2 districts. The ordinance includes a grandfather clause, which states that non-conforming structures existing at the time the structural requirements were created need not comply, unless the structure is enlarged, moved, or substantially destroyed. The City's zoning ordinance was initially enacted in 1979 and amended in 1998. Both the Horton home and the structure on the Helmcamp property were in existence at the time of the initial enactment in 1979.
In the fall of 2002, the Helmcamps began using their property as the "Waystation Opry," a live-music venue. Before launching the Waystation Opry, the Helmcamps sought the advice of Jack Page, the City's Public Works Director, regarding whether the property was zoned for use as a live-music venue. Page indicated that he believed that the property was zoned for such use. In response to Horton's complaints regarding the Waystation Opry, Page conferred with Tex Middlebrook, Smithville City Manager. After reviewing the zoning ordinance, both Middlebrook and Page came to the conclusion that the property's use as a live-music venue did not violate the ordinance. Page then informed Horton that her only recourse against the Waystation Opry would be to inform the police if the music became loud enough to violate the City's noise ordinance.
The parties do not dispute that the Waystation Opry fails to comport with the set-back, parking, and noise barrier requirements of the City's zoning ordinance. Page and Middlebrook, after reviewing the ordinance, took the position that the Helmcamps' property is exempt from these requirements because it is subject to the grandfather clause for nonconforming structures.
On October 15, 2002, Horton brought suit in federal court against the City and the Helmcamps, alleging violations of her equal protection and due process rights, as well as conspiracy, fraud, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The federal district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment as to all federal claims and dismissed without prejudice all state-law claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
In response to Horton's litigation and the accompanying legal fees, the Helmcamps voluntarily discontinued the Waystation Opry. Since that time, the Waystation Opry has not operated on the Helmcamps' property. (1) During the time of its operation, the Waystation Opry hosted a total of six live-music events, which were held on one Saturday per month from the hours of 6:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
While Horton's suit was pending in federal court, she filed suit against the City and the Helmcamps in state court, pleading causes of action for nuisance, civil conspiracy, unconstitutional taking, and violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity and that Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Alternatively, the City moved for both traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The trial court issued an order granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. (2) The claims against the City were subsequently severed, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Horton contends that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims because she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies and because the Texas Tort Claims Act provides a statutory waiver of the City's governmental immunity. She further contends that summary judgment was improper because she presented a fact issue regarding her claims of nuisance and unconstitutional taking. Horton does not appeal the trial court's judgment regarding her causes of action for civil conspiracy or violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether this burden has been met and whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts establishes or negates a trial court's jurisdiction are questions of law reviewed de novo. Id. In performing this review, an appellate court does not look to the merits of the case but considers only the pleadings and evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id.
ANALYSIS
Objections to Appellant's Brief
The City argues that because Horton's brief does not include citations to the appellate record and her appendix contains items that are not part of the appellate record, she has failed to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and therefore has waived all points of error on appeal.
It is a basic and well-established rule of appellate procedure that statements of fact in a party's brief must be supported by record references. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). An appellant is required to refer the appellate court to those portions of the record that support her argument, as the appellate court "is under no duty to make an independent search of the record for evidence supporting an appellant's position." Brandon v. American Sterilizer Co., 880 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ). Horton's statement of facts makes no reference to the appellate record.
However, the rules of appellate procedure also require that briefing rules be liberally construed. Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; see Moore County v. Bergner, 526 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1975, no writ) ("If we can determine from the points of error, the statements, and the arguments the complaints presented by appellant's brief, then we will liberally construe the briefing rules to pass on the merits of the case."); Brown v. Malinowski, 347 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1961, no writ) (noting that, where no record references were made in a statement of facts, "[w]e have applied extremely liberal construction to the briefing rules so as to consider the brief"). Because we are able to determine the complaints presented by Horton's brief, we will apply a liberal construction of the briefing rules so that we may address the merits of her case.
However, we cannot consider those portions of Horton's appendix that are not included in the appellate record. See Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979) (appellate courts may not consider matters outside the appellate record). Tab F of Horton's appendix includes a DVD containing video footage that was referenced by counsel during the trial court's hearing on the City's motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction. On October 19, 2007, this Court issued an order denying Horton's motion to include this video in the appellate record because there was no indication that it had been properly admitted into evidence in the trial court. (3) Tab G of Horton's appendix includes an unsigned affidavit by Horton which describes the video found at Tab F. This affidavit does not appear in the appellate record. Tab I of the appendix includes pages of Middlebrook's deposition transcript that were not included in the record, specifically transcript pages 87, 88, 191, and 194. Materials outside the record that are improperly attached to a party's brief may be stricken and may not be considered on appeal. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, writ denied). As a result, we will strike Tabs F and G from Horton's appendix, as well as the portion of Tab I that includes transcript pages 87, 88, 191, and 194.
Administrative Remedies
Section 211.009 of the Texas Local Government Code provides that a local "board of adjustment" may hear and decide an appeal that alleges error in an order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement of a local zoning ordinance. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.009(a)(1) (West 1999). Furthermore, an appeal of a local administrative official's zoning decision may be brought by any "person aggrieved by the decision." Id. § 211.010(a). In the City of Smithville, a Type A general-law municipality, the city council acts as the board of adjustment. See id. § 211.008(g) ("The governing body of a Type A general-law municipality by ordinance may grant the members of the governing body the authority to act as a board of adjustment under this chapter.").
Horton, by virtue of bringing this suit, clearly considers herself to be a person aggrieved by the presence of the Waystation Opry on the Helmcamps' property. While the city council did not issue any type of official order declaring that the Waystation Opry complied with the zoning ordinance, the record reflects that the Waystation Opry was allowed to operate in a C-2 district based on Page's determination as Public Works Director and Middlebrook's determination as City Manager that the Waystation Opry did not violate the zoning ordinance. Horton concedes that she did not appeal the decision of either Page or Middlebrook to the city council as described in sections 211.009 and 211.010 of the Texas Local Government Code, nor did she attempt to get either decision in writing.
The exhaustion rule requires that plaintiffs pursue all available remedies within the administrative process before seeking judicial relief, and the failure to do so deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 52 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tex. App.--Austin 2001, pet. denied). Texas Local Government Code sections 211.009 and 211.010 provide administrative remedies regarding local zoning decisions that must be exhausted before such matters may be brought to the courts for determination. See City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2006, pet. denied); Wynn v. City of Irving, 770 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ) ("It is settled that the administrative remedies provided by Local Government Code section 211.009-.010 . . . must be exhausted before matters regarding nonconforming uses may be brought before the courts.); Thomas v. City of San Marcos, 477 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. App.--Austin 1972, no writ). Section 211.010(a) provides that an aggrieved party "may appeal to the board of adjustment a decision made by an administrative official." Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.010(a) (emphasis added). When a statute provides that a party "may" appeal, such language has been interpreted to mean that an aggrieved party may appeal, but if an appeal is taken, it must be taken to the administrative entity. See Grimes v. Stringer, 957 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1997, pet. denied). It is undisputed that Horton failed to appeal Page and Middlebrook's determinations to the city council.
Horton asserts in her reply brief that any pursuit of administrative remedies "would have been futile and therefore not required." Horton's contention that she is relieved of the exhaustion requirement because she does not expect the city council to grant her a favorable result is unsupported by Texas law. There is an exception to the exhaustion requirement if the available administrative remedies are inadequate or the exhaustion of such remedies would cause irreparable injury. MAG-T, L.P. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 161 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, pet. denied). However, Horton has not made a showing that the exhaustion of administrative remedies would cause irreparable injury, and in light of the fact that the Waystation Opry has ceased operation, it is unlikely that such a showing could be made. Horton has also failed to establish that the city council lacks the authority to grant the particular relief she seeks. See id. ("[P]arties should not be required to pursue the administrative process if the parties would suffer irreparable harm and if the agency is unable to provide relief.").
Horton further argues that because the City "refuses" to enforce its zoning ordinance, there has been no official action by the City and therefore no administrative remedy is available to her. However, the conduct that Horton mischaracterizes as a refusal to enforce a zoning ordinance can be more accurately described as the City's interpretation of its zoning ordinance in a manner adverse to Horton's interests. Furthermore, Horton's argument fails because the statute provides that an aggrieved person may appeal "an order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official in the enforcement" of a zoning ordinance. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.009(a)(1) (West 1999). This language does not require an official order by the city, but merely a determination by an administrative official--a city manager or public works director such as Middlebrook or Page, for example--regarding the enforcement of a zoning ordinance. A determination by two of the City's administrative officials regarding the enforcement of a zoning ordinance is precisely the action that Horton complains of here. Horton, however, failed to appeal the determination of either Middlebrook or Page to the city council and instead filed suit directly in the trial court. Until the City's official position has been determined through the administrative process created by the Texas Local Government Code, there is no justiciable controversy before the trial court. See Winn v. City of Irving, 770 S.W.2d 10, 11-12 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ).
On appeal, Horton requests a declaration from this Court that the City must enforce its zoning ordinance. Such a statement would be advisory, and in any case, wholly unnecessary, because the City has stated, both in its brief and at oral argument, that it is in fact enforcing its zoning ordinance in relation to the Helmcamps' property. Therefore, a declaration such as the one Horton requests, assuming it would be legally accurate, would have no practical effect. In support of her request, Horton asserted at oral argument that such a declaration would give the City an incentive to settle this dispute. This Court declines to issue an impermissible advisory opinion stating that the City must enforce its zoning laws simply because Horton believes that such an opinion might intimidate the City into conceding to her in a zoning dispute that has not yet been addressed at an administrative level. See University of Texas v. Morris, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1961) ("[J]udicial processes cannot be used for purposes of mere harassment in an effort to effect settlements.").
Because Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the trial court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction, and we need not address whether the trial court also lacked jurisdiction on the basis of the City's governmental immunity. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring opinions to be as brief as practicable in addressing issues necessary to final disposition of appeal). Similarly, we need not decide the issues related to the City's motion for summary judgment because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of all claims raised on appeal. The only cause of action falling outside the reach of the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement is the claim of violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act and because that issue was not raised on appeal, it has been waived. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993).
CONCLUSION
Because Horton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under Texas Local Government Code sections 211.009 and 211.010, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court's order is affirmed.
__________________________________________
Diane Henson, Justice
Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Waldrop and Henson
Affirmed
Filed: January 25, 2008
1. While the Waystation Opry is no longer in operation, a live controversy remains because Horton sought monetary damages in relation to her unconstitutional takings claim. See Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, 104 S.W.3d 544, 545 (Tex. 2003) (holding that when monetary damages are at issue, live issue remains in controversy).
2. Because the plea to the jurisdiction did not address the claims made under the Texas Open Meetings Act, the trial court's grant of the plea to the jurisdiction did not dispose of all claims, requiring the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment as well.
3. While Horton's motion to include video footage of the Waystation Opry in the appellate record was denied, the Court notes that there was sufficient testimony in the record, particularly Horton's deposition and the affidavit signed by Paul Horton, to ascertain the general nature and decibel level of the Waystation Opry's live-music events.
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