Covert v. Williamson Central Appraisal District (Tex.App.- Austin 2007)

Rox Covert, Duke Covert and Danay Covert v. Williamson Central Appraisal District, No. (Tex. App. - Austin, Nov. 30, 2007) (Opinion by Justice Henson)(property tax protests, cases, appeals) (Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Henson)
Appeal from 277th District Court of Williamson County

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 01-466-C277, HONORABLE KEN ANDERSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

O P I N I O N

In this appeal, we decide whether a taxpayer is entitled under section 42.26 of the tax code to challenge only the land component of an ad valorem property tax appraisal of improved land, without claiming that the total appraised value of the property is unequal. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.26(a)(3) (West Supp. 2007). (1) Appellants Rox Covert, Duke Covert and Danay Covert sued Williamson Central Appraisal District ("WCAD") (2) in district court, challenging WCAD's appraisal of five separate tracts of land, three of which are improved with car dealerships, on the grounds that they were not appraised equally and uniformly. See Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 20; Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.26(d) (West 2001). WCAD filed a special exception, contending that the Coverts' pleadings failed to state a cause of action with respect to the three improved properties because the Coverts had alleged that only the land components, and not the entire properties, had been appraised unequally. The trial court granted WCAD's special exception and ordered the Coverts to replead. The Coverts refused, and their case was dismissed. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting WCAD's special exception and in dismissing the claims after ruling that the Coverts had omitted an element of their cause of action, namely that their property was appraised unequally under section 42.26 of the tax code. Holding that the trial court did not err because the statute requires a taxpayer to challenge the appraised valuation of the entire improved property and not merely its component values, we affirm.

* * *

We therefore hold that a taxpayer challenging the equal and uniform assessment of an improved property under section 42.26 must allege that the overall appraised value of the property is unequal. While he is not prevented from bringing evidence that only the land or only the improvement was unequally assessed, the taxpayer must allege that the value of the improved property was appraised unequally in order to state a cause of action under section 42.26.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court did not err in granting the dismissal, we affirm.
_____________________________________
Diane Henson, Justice
Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Henson
Affirmed
Filed: November 30, 2007

Lake Travis ISD v. Lovelace (Tex.App. - Austin 2007)

School District's suit to shut down as nuisance prolific requests under the Open Records Act fails.

Appellant, Lake Travis Independent School District// Cross-Appellants, David Lovelace and Melissa Lovelace v. Appellees, David Lovelace and Melissa Lovelace// Cross-Appellee, Lake Travis Independent School District, No. (Tex.App.- Austin, Nov. 29, 2007)
(Opinion by Justice Henson )(Open Records Act, Public Information Act, nuisance theory)(Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Waldrop and Henson)
Appeal from 126th District Court of Travis County

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-06-003726, HONORABLE SUZANNE COVINGTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

O P I N I O N

Lake Travis Independent School District ("District") appeals an order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction its suit against David and Melissa Lovelace alleging common-law claims for public nuisance and abuse of governmental process.

The District sought (1) temporary and permanent injunctions against the Lovelaces to prevent them from submitting requests for public information under the Texas Public Information Act ("PIA") (1) or, in the alternative, a court-ordered procedure applicable to all requests submitted by the Lovelaces modifying the form that their requests would take under the PIA; (2) declarations that the Lovelaces had abused and misused the PIA, that all future requests by the Lovelaces for information pursuant to the PIA shall be governed by a modified, court-ordered process, and that the District would not be in violation of the PIA by complying with the modified process; and (3) actual monetary damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The trial court ruled that the District's suit was barred by section 552.324 of the PIA, and the District appeals. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.324 (West 2004). The Lovelaces bring a cross-appeal from the trial court's order denying them attorney's fees. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

* * *

CONCLUSION

Because we find that the legislature specifically precluded suits against requestors of public information and that the appropriate remedy for abuses related to the PIA must be provided by the legislature within the statutory framework, we affirm the trial court's dismissal. We further hold that the denial of sanctions to the Lovelaces was not an abuse of discretion.
_____________________________________
Diane Henson, Justice
Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Waldrop and Henson
Affirmed
Filed: November 29, 2007

1. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001-.353 (West 2004).
2. The SBEC is the agency responsible for the licensing and discipline of certified educators in Texas.
3. Although the Lovelaces complain of the court's failure to award attorney's fees, they essentially contest the trial court's refusal to find that the District's suit was groundless, frivolous, and brought in bad faith or for an improper purpose. Therefore, we refer to the Lovelaces' issue on cross-appeal as the trial court's failure to impose sanctions on the District.
4. From the time the PIA became effective, the legislature has allowed governmental bodies to charge reasonable fees when disclosing information "in an effort to ensure that the governmental body was not overly burdened." See Tex. H.B. 1718, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (concerning the revision of open records law). See also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.230 (West Supp. 2006) (providing that a governmental body may promulgate reasonable rules of procedure under which public information may be inspected), .232 (providing procedures for responding to repetitious or redundant requests), .263 (providing that an officer for public information may require a deposit or bond for payment of anticipated costs for the preparation of a copy of public information).
5. Section 552.353 sets forth the consequences for a public information officer's failure to provide access to public information and is not relevant to this discussion. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 553.353 (West Supp. 2006).
6. The suit would be barred even if the District were to withdraw its request for injunctive relief and seek only a modified, court-ordered procedure to apply to the Lovelaces' requests. The effect under that scheme would be to remove the Lovelaces from the system created by the PIA, withholding information specifically from them that would ordinarily be made available under the statute.
7. We also note that the legislature has already begun to implement additional safeguards under the PIA in apparent response to the concerns of this sort of misuse voiced by governmental bodies. See, e.g., the "36-hour rule," Act of May 27, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., H.B. 2564, § 1 (to be codified at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.275) (effective Sept. 1, 2007) (allowing governmental bodies to establish reasonable time limits on the amount of personnel time spent producing or providing copies of public information, not less than 36 hours in a 12-month period).
8. Our holding precludes both of the District's common-law causes of action. Apparently subsumed within its general allegation that the Lovelaces' conduct is a common-law public nuisance and an abuse of governmental process, however, is the District's claim that the Lovelaces misused the District's and the SBEC's complaint procedures. In its brief, the District states, "the District's position was that the Lovelaces' overall approach to requesting documents - the massive number of often simultaneous requests . . . and the internal and external complaints filed under and related to the TPIA - was all part of a concerted effort to harass the District and its employees" (emphasis added). The District did not brief the "misuse of complaint procedures" issue as though it offers a separate basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. Any argument that the District has a common-law claim for public nuisance or abuse of governmental process because of the Lovelaces' misuse of the complaint procedures (unrelated to the PIA) is therefore waived. See Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(h); see also GSC Enters., Inc. v. Rylander, 85 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002, no pet.).
9. See Thompson v. Kimbrough, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 350, 57 S.W. 328 (Dallas 1900, writ ref'd). In that case, a school district successfully sued the county for common-law public nuisance to prevent the establishment of a smallpox "pesthouse" near a school building. Id. at 329.
10. Amicus Eanes Independent School District filed a brief in support of the District, discussing similar abuses and costs incurred in that district stemming from requests for public information pursuant to the PIA.
11. The Lovelaces offer no support for their allegation that the District's suit was a strategic lawsuit against public participation, commonly known as a "SLAPP" suit. Black defines a SLAPP suit as "a suit brought by a developer, corporate executive, or elected official to stifle those who protest against some type of high-dollar initiative or who take an adverse position on a public-interest issue." Black's Law Dictionary 1393 (7th ed. 1999). The District contends that it has fully complied with each of the 2,274 requests for public information made by the Lovelaces, and the Lovelaces have not pointed us to any evidence to the contrary. Nor does the record contain any indication that the District intended to stifle the Lovelaces because of the position the Lovelaces have taken with respect to the "issue" of open government.

Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction - no final judgment because claims against other defendants remained pending

William Arnett Hall v. Harris County, Texas; Mary Bacon, Denise Crawford and Terrance Windham, No (Tex.App.- Austin, Oct. 17, 2007)(Opinion by Justice Henson)(DWOJ, judgement not final, no statutory authority for interlocutory appeal)(Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Henson)
Appeal from 345th District Court of Travis County
Disposition: DWOP (Dismissed for want of jurisdiction)

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-GN-06-001806, HONORABLE GISELA D. TRIANA, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On May 6, 1986, the 338th district court of Harris County found appellant William Arnett Hall guilty of sexual assault and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On May 22, 2006, Hall sued appellees Mary Bacon and Denise Crawford, the respective judge and prosecutor of the 338th district court at the time of his conviction, appellee Terrance Windham, Hall's court-appointed defense attorney, and appellee Harris County for alleged wrongs resulting from the prosecution. After Hall obtained service on Crawford and Windham, Crawford moved to dismiss the claims against her for having no arguable basis in law or fact. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2) (West 2002). Crawford also moved to dismiss on the grounds that Hall, an inmate, failed to file the required declaration of previous pro se suits. See id. § 14.004. On October 19, 2006, the trial court granted Crawford's first motion by dismissing Hall's claims against her with prejudice. In the same order the trial court granted Crawford's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 14.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Hall appeals the order.

In general, a party can only appeal from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Any other appeal must be authorized by statute. See id. An order given without a trial on the merits is not a final judgment in the context of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every party and claim or it clearly and unequivocally states that it disposes of all parties and claims. Id. at 205.

The order from which Hall appeals does not mention any defendant other than Crawford, stating, "that plaintiff William Arnett Hall take nothing from Crawford; and that any and all relief sought from or against Crawford in the instant case is denied." Language stating that the plaintiff take nothing from only one defendant does not show finality when there are multiple defendants in the suit. See id. The order also, when granting dismissal under section 14.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, grants dismissal of "Hall's petition" with no other qualifiers so that it is unclear whether the trial court also dismissed Hall's petition with respect to the rest of the parties. Thus, we cannot say that the order clearly and unequivocally states that it disposes of all parties and claims.

We could still have jurisdiction over Hall's appeal if the order actually disposes of all parties and claims. When questioned to that effect by this Court, (1) Hall responded in a letter dated May 7, 2007, "NO I do not believe that the said judgment is final and or do [sic] it effect [sic] the other defendants in no [sic] way." Because Hall admits that the order from which he appeals does not dispose of all parties and claims, the order is not a final judgment. Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Hall's appeal unless an appeal from the order is authorized by statute. The relevant statute only authorizes the appeal of certain categories of interlocutory orders, and Hall's order does not fit within any of them. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2006).

Because Hall has not obtained an appealable interlocutory order or a final judgment in his cause, we must dismiss his appeal for want of jurisdiction.
__________________________________________
Diane Henson, Justice
Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Henson
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: October 17, 2007
1. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.220(c) (West 2004).